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1 | INTRODUCTION  
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by 
examining: (a) the predictive effect (informativeness) of 
financial reporting with specific focus on risk disclosures 
on banks' credit ratings (BCRs); and (b) consequently 
ascertains whether governance structures have a 
Abstract 
This study examines whether financial reporting with a specific focus on risk 
disclosures have a predictive (informative) effect on banks' credit ratings 
(BCRs) and, consequently, ascertains whether governance structures can mod-
erate such an association. Using one of the largest bank-level datasets collected 
from 12 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries over the 2006–2013 
period to-date, our findings are as follows. First, we find that risk disclosures 
have a predictive effect on BCRs. Second, we find that the relationship between 
risk disclosures and BCRs is contingent on the quality of governance structures. 
Specifically, we find that the informativeness of risk disclosures on BCRs is 
higher in banks with larger board size, greater independence, higher govern-
ment ownership, and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in banks with 
greater block ownership, higher foreign ownership and the presence of CEO 
duality. The central tenor of our findings remains unchanged after controlling 
for a number of firm- and country-level factors, alternative risk disclosure mea-
sures, firm- and national-level governance proxies, different types of banks, and 
potential endogeneities. The findings have important implications for investors, 
especially bondholders, standard-setters, regulators, and central governments. 
KEYWORD S  
banks' credit ratings, debt markets, financial reporting, governance structures, MENA, risk 
disclosures 
moderating effect on the risk disclosures–BCRs nexus 
using the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) BCRs 
over the 2006–2013 period. 
Meanwhile, the past decade has witnessed a number 
of corporate crises, including the global financial crisis 
(GFC), the Eurozone crisis, Chinese stock market crash 
and several high-profile bank failures around the world 
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(e.g., Lehman Brothers in the USA, Northern Rock in the 
UK, and the Dubai Islamic Bank in the UAE). These cri-
ses have affected the banking sector worldwide, as well 
as reignited concerns relating to the effectiveness of 
financial reporting, risk management and disclosure 
practices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
[BCBS], 2015a, 2015b; Beisland, Mersland, & Randøy, 
2014; Hasan, 2011; Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017). The 
GFC, in particular, has stimulated regulators worldwide 
to focus more closely on pursuing governance and regula-
tory reforms aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of risk 
disclosure and governance mechanisms, especially within 
the banking sector (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 
2008; Walker, 2009). Similarly, the BCBS suggests that 
comprehensive and effective risk disclosure practices are 
central to achieving and maintaining public trust and 
confidence (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015a, 
2015b; Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 2013). 
Indeed, the Basel Accords (i.e., I, II, and III), interna-
tional and domestic equivalent accounting standards (e.g., 
IFRS 7, 9, IAS 32, 39), and governance codes (e.g., World 
Bank and Saudi governance codes) are often aimed at 
strengthening the need for comprehensive risk manage-
ment and disclosure practices. Similarly, identifying, mea-
suring, managing, controlling and, more importantly, 
reporting and disclosing risks are becoming more critical as 
the global banking sector becomes increasingly complex 
and opaque. Generally, the Basel Accords, governance 
codes and IFRS/IAS concentrate on qualitative and quanti-
tative disclosures regarding credit, liquidity, and market 
risks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015b). 
The crucial policy question, however, is whether the 
market considers such Basel, IFRS/IAS and governance 
reforms-inspired risk disclosures informative about a firm's 
current and future prospects, and in particular, whether 
debt markets react to such risk disclosures. Admittedly, a 
number of plausible theoretical explanations exist. For 
example, agency theory predicts that increased risk disclo-
sures can enhance managerial monitoring and reduce infor-
mation asymmetry, which can reduce cost of capital by 
improving BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, & LaFond, 2006; Chan, Hsu, & Lee, 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Kuang & Qin, 2013). Similarly, signalling, 
legitimacy, and resource Maghzom dependence theories 
predict that improved risk disclosures  can send important  
signals to credit rating agencies about the current and 
future performance and risk management strengths of a 
bank. Such improved risk disclosure may facilitate access to 
resources, legitimise banks' operations, and hence, equally 
reduce the cost of capital by enhancing their BCRs. 
Furthermore, He (2018) suggests that managers have 
a motivation to sustain or accomplish a favourable credit 
rating irrespective of the rating agency's knowledge and 
insights about a firm's creditworthiness. Current research 
suggests that the benefits (costs) related to a credit rating 
change tend to influence decision-making about capital 
structure (e.g., Kisgen, 2006, 2009) and firm financing 
choices (Hovakimian, Kayhan, & Titman, 2010). Simi-
larly studies indicate that companies are more likely to 
modify leverage in order to influence rating agencies' 
judgements. Yet, leverage is not the only information for 
credit rating agencies in deciding a company's actual 
credit rating. The rating procedures also require analysis 
of annual reports that is related to a firm's creditworthi-
ness (Standard & Poor's, 2009). 
Accordingly, previous studies have examined the drivers 
of, and reasons for, the incident and amount of risk disclo-
sures (Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly, 2016a, 2016b; 
Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy, Fraser, & 
Hussainey, 2014; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 
2013). However, prior evidence relating to the economic 
consequences or informativeness of risk disclosures relating 
to BCRs is rare. The closest existing studies that are available 
are those of Aman and Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2006), Chan et al. (2013), DeBoskey and Gillett (2013), 
and Kuang and Qin (2013), which generally found a positive 
relationship between traditional voluntary disclosure quality 
and BCRs. By contrast, and based on our extensive literature 
search, no previous research has examined whether credit 
rating agencies incorporate risk disclosures into their risk 
evaluations in  the  process of generating BCRs for  banks.  
One plausible reason might be the general difficulty of 
accessing appropriate risk data, and especially the observ-
able labour intensive nature of collecting risk data (Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the empirical evidence relating to governance 
structures is limited, but largely suggests that good gover-
nance structures in terms of board size, independent and 
diverse boards, and concentrating less power in the hands 
of few senior managers, such as CEOs, can have a positive 
impact on BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen, 
2011; Grassa, 2015; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; 
Kuang & Qin, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Li, Armstrong, & 
Clarke, 2014; Lin, Liu, & Noronha, 2016; Nguyen & Niel-
sen, 2010). Thus and by extension, it seems reasonable to 
argue that it is possible for the potential relationship 
between risk disclosures and BCRs to be further moderated 
by the quality of governance structures in a bank. 
However, the above prior literature appears to suffer 
from a number of limitations. Firstly, limited prior stud-
ies have mainly examined the informativeness of risk dis-
closures in developed countries (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; 
Maffei, Aria, Fiondella, Spanò, & Zagaria, 2014; Rajgopal, 
1999); and observably, large-scale, cross-country studies 
are generally rare (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Lau, 
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Shrestha, & Yu, 2016; Tan, Zeng, & Elshandidy, 2017), 
but almost non-existent in developing countries. Sec-
ondly, despite our extensive literature search, we did not 
find any evidence on whether multi-governance struc-
tures (e.g., Islamic governance, board structures and own-
ership structures) can moderate the relationship between 
risk disclosures and BCRs in different regulatory environ-
ments, such as MENA countries. Thus, this empirical 
lacuna arguably offers a genuine opportunity to make 
original contributions to the existing literature. 
Meanwhile, the MENA setting is particularly appropri-
ate for this study because MENA banks display distinctive 
Islamic banking, economics, finance, and business charac-
teristics along with discernible significant weaknesses 
regarding governance structures (Hasan, & Habib, 2016; 
Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016). For instance, MENA 
banks are characterised by high levels of ownership con-
centration in the form of family- or government-owned 
banks and more recently increased foreign participation 
(Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & 
Stapleton, 2012; World Bank, 2009). MENA banks are also 
characterised by weak disclosure and transparency prac-
tices, primarily due to weak central government monitor-
ing and enforcement of corporate regulations (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 
2009). However and spurred on by the need to pursue eco-
nomic and market reforms, often aimed at attracting for-
eign direct investments, regulators, and policymakers in 
the MENA region have recently subscribed to IFRS/IAS, 
committed the Basel Accords and established several gover-
nance codes. The aim of these reforms is to enshrine share-
holder rights, especially minority shareholders, enhance 
accountability, and improve market transparency (Amico, 
2014; Koldertsova, 2011; World Bank, 2009). 
In addition to governance and IFRS/IAS reforms that 
have been pursued in the MENA region, many commer-
cial banks have opened windows for Islamic banking. 
This is largely in response to the remarkable large-scale 
growth in Islamic banking and finance worldwide, but 
particularly in the MENA region (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Merrouche, 2013; Ernst and Young, 2012; Ozturk, 
2014; Safieddine, 2009). Observably and although Islamic 
banks have the same governance structures, they are 
required to distinctively operate in a Shariah compliant 
manner, which often creates further unique governance 
and risk challenges, especially the risk emanating from 
potential Shariah non-compliance (Beck et al., 2013; 
Safieddine, 2009). Further, the Islamic banking sector has 
generally been operating with limited central government 
oversight, which can arguably increase the risk of Islamic 
banks potentially failing (e.g., Islas Finance House in 
Turkey) (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015; Hasan, 
2011; Safieddine, 2009). 
Consequently, this study seeks to distinctively exam-
ine the relationship among risk disclosures, BCRs, and 
governance structures in the MENA region, and in the 
process, make a number of new contributions to the 
extant literature. First, we contribute to the literature by 
providing first-time systematic evidence on the level of 
risk disclosures by banks across the MENA region. Sec-
ond, the study contributes to the literature by providing a 
first-time evidence on the link between risk disclosures 
and BCRs that shows that increased risk disclosures are 
associated with higher level of bank credit ratings. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature by providing a 
first-time evidence on the moderating effect of gover-
nance structures on the risk disclosure–BCRs nexus. Spe-
cifically, we show that the informativeness of risk 
disclosures on BCRs is higher in banks with larger board 
size, greater independence, higher government owner-
ship, and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in 
banks with greater block ownership, higher foreign own-
ership and the presence of CEO duality. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. 
The following section reviews BCRs, risk disclosures, gov-
ernance reforms, and Islamic governance in MENA con-
text. The next sections discuss the theoretical framework 
for BCRs, review empirical literature on risk disclosures 
and governance structures, outline the research design, 
report the empirical results, and provide a conclusion. 
2 | BCRs,  RISK  DISCLOSURE  AND  
GOVERNANCE  REFORMS  IN  MENA  
BANKS  
BCRs have recently been expanded and attracted signifi-
cant attention from financial market investors, debt issuers, 
analysts, regulators and policymakers seeking unbiased 
assessments of creditworthiness of banks, especially in 
murky information environments, where the credibility of 
the credit rating agencies has been questioned (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Cavallo, Powell, & Rigobon, 2013; 
Iannotta, Nocera, & Resti, 2013; Lobo, Paugam, Stolowy, & 
Astolfi, 2017; Montes, Oliveira, & Mendonça, 2016; Salva-
dor, Pastor, & de Guevara, 2014; Switzer & Wang, 2017). 
BCRs are arguably more efficient in reflecting overall 
performance since banks are inherently opaque, but are 
exposed to a multiplicity of risks, and hence, stakeholders 
tend to rely on independent ratings provided by rating 
agencies as a way of assessing their financial viability 
(Beisland et al., 2014; Kusi & Opoku-Mensah, 2018; Mor-
eira & Zhao, 2018). One reason is that the rules that inde-
pendent credit rating agencies apply to measure bank 
ratings do not rely on banks' conventional performance 
metrics only, but also on other characteristics. These 
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include management quality, capital adequacy, asset 
quality, risk management, growth prospects, efficiency 
and internal control processes. Thus, BCRs arguably has 
a superior ability to accurately reflect actual bank credit 
quality (Beisland et al., 2014; Cheng & Subramanyam, 
2008). Moreover, when a rating score is assigned, the 
credit rating agencies generally are concerned with the 
banks' governance structures since weak firm- and coun-
try-level governance structures can impair the bank's 
financial performance. This can also affect the financial 
information quality disclosed to stakeholders (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Fitch Ratings, 2004; Grassa, 2015). 
The GFC, in particular, has stimulated regulators 
worldwide to pursue risk and governance reforms aimed 
at improving risk disclosure and governance practices 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 2008; Martín-Oliver, 
Ruano, & Salas-Fumás, 2017; Ntim et al., 2013; Walker, 
2009; Yamori, Harimaya, & Tomimura, 2017). For exam-
ple, the Basel Accords place unique emphasis on the role 
of external credit rating agencies by permitting banks to 
measure credit risk-weighted assets, which are based on 
the external ratings assigned by a credible rating agency 
(BCBS, 2006; Duff & Einig, 2009). 
Consequently, regulators in MENA countries place a sig-
nificant focus on the comprehensive risk management and 
risk disclosures in banks that are widely currently perceived 
as being insufficient, but by contrast, apparently have a sig-
nificant impact on their ability to attract foreign investment 
(Amico, 2014). As a result, most of the MENA countries 
have adopted the Basel Accords (I, II, III) and IFRS (7, 9)/ 
IAS (32, 39) or their domestic equivalent standards. These 
reforms and standards have sought to strengthen the need 
for comprehensive risk management and disclosure prac-
tices. Specifically, the Basel Accords (I, II, III), governance 
codes (Saudi code), and IFRS (7, 9)/IAS (32, 39) concentrate 
on qualitative and quantitative disclosure in relation to 
credit, liquidity, and market risks. However, the Basel 
Accords only consider operational risk as a separate cate-
gory, while the IFRS/IAS lack sufficient granularity in some 
key risk areas (e.g., operational and strategic risks), which in 
general are omitted from risk disclosure regulations (Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013). This implies that any robust framework 
for managing, measuring, and disclosing risk ought to draw 
its items from multiple sources (e.g., the  Basel Accords, gov-
ernance codes, and IFRS/IAS) rather than a single source. 
Importantly, many countries in the MENA region and 
other emerging markets, which experienced banking fail-
ures during GFC, have apparent weaknesses in political sta-
bility, government effectiveness, regulatory environment, 
and governance systems, as shown in Table 1 (Bikker & 
Vervliet, 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Moreover, MENA banks have significant weaknesses 
regarding governance structures. In particular, MENA 
banks are characterised by high levels of ownership concen-
tration in the form of family- or government-owned banks, 
and recently increased foreign participation, as well as dual 
board structure, often consisting of conventional and Sha-
riah supervisory boards (Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et al., 
2012; World Bank, 2009). Further, MENA banks are 
characterised by weak disclosure and transparency, primar-
ily due to disclosure–averse culture and weaker govern-
ment oversight and enforcement (Kaufmann et al., 2010; 
Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009). 
In addition to explicit commitment to the principles of 
the Basel Accords and pursuance of governance and IFRS/ 
IAS reforms by countries in the MENA region (e.g., every 
MENA  country has  issued  a CG code and  subscribes  to  
some form of IFRS/IAS), many commercial banks have 
opened windows for Islamic banking, especially after the 
remarkable large-scale growth in Islamic  banking and  
finance worldwide, but particularly in this region (Beck 
et al., 2013; Ernst & Young, 2012; Ozturk, 2014; Safieddine, 
2009). Thus and although Islamic banks have the same gov-
ernance structures, they are required to operate in a Sha-
riah-compliant manner. This creates unique governance 
structures, as well as raises a new risk called “Shariah risk” 
concerning the potential risk of becoming Shariah non-
compliant, which can generate a further financial turmoil 
and threaten Islamic banks' activities (e.g., cash deposits 
and withdrawals), and hence damage the banks' reputation 
(Abedifar, Giudici, & Hashem, 2017; Ashraf, Rizwan, & 
L'Huillier, 2016; Aysan & Ozturk, 2018; Bitar, Hassan, & 
Walker, 2017; Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015; 
Hassan & Aliyu, 2018; Safieddine, 2009). Further, Islamic 
banking has typically been operating with a weaker govern-
ment oversight, which has led to a number of noticeable 
Islamic bank failures (e.g., Islas Finance House in Turkey, 
the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Islamic Investment Companies 
of Egypt) (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2015; Hasan, 
2011; Safieddine, 2009). Additionally, Islamic banks rely on 
a risk-sharing models and  are required to be more transpar-
ent and accountable compared to conventional counter-
parts. One way by which they can demonstrate greater 
accountability and transparency is to engage in increased 
disclosure of their risk exposures. Together, this arguably 
offers a unique context to examine the relationship among 
risk disclosures, BCRs, and governance structures. 
3 | LITERATURE  REVIEW:  
THEORY,  EMPIRICS  AND  
RESEARCH  HYPOTHESES  
DEVELOPMENT  
In this section, we first briefly outline the theories under-
pinning our  study and  then, subsequently,  rely  on  the  
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TABLE  1  Cross-regional worldwide governance indicators comparison 
Political stability 
Voice and and absence of Government Regulatory Rule Control of 
accountability violence/terrorism effectiveness quality of law corruption 
East Asia & Pacific 54 63 49 47 56 53 
Europe & Central Asia 66 63 68 69 66 63 
Latin America & Caribbean 61 55 58 56 51 57 
MENA 25 28 44 44 44 45 
North America 87 77 89 90 60 89 
South Asia 34 23 34 26 32 34 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32 34 27 30 29 30 
Note: Each number in each cell refers to the overall score (%) given to each region under each of the worldwide governance indicators. 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (World Bank, 2015). 
briefly outlined theories along with insights from the related 
prior empirical studies in developing our hypotheses. 
3.1 | Theory 
The incentives to change bank-level outcomes (e.g., 
BCRs) are generally explained by a number of plausible 
theories due to the complex and opaque nature of bank 
performance. However, a comprehensive theory to 
understand the performance and disclosure does not yet 
exist. Hence, recent studies have called for richer expla-
nations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Grove et al., 2011; 
Heflin, Shaw, & Wild, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). For exam-
ple, agency theory suggests that there are inherent con-
flicts, which tend to create agency problems between 
bank shareholders and their managers on the one hand, 
and bondholders and shareholders on the other hand. 
Consequently, greater managerial monitoring often asso-
ciated with increased risk disclosure can lead to a better 
alignment of interests among shareholders, managers 
and bondholders by reducing information asymmetry, 
and thereby enhance BCRs (Chan et al., 2013; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Grove et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Similarly and with respect to signalling theory 
(Spence, 1973), the primary objective of corporate disclo-
sure is to inform stakeholders about the firm's current 
and future performance and value. This suggests that dis-
closure decisions, such as risk disclosures can send sig-
nals to the market regarding a bank's current and future 
performance and risk exposures. 
Publicly released risk disclosures matter for credit rating 
agencies for two main reasons (He, 2018). First, publicly dis-
closed risk information is subject to scrutiny from both 
external investors and legal agencies. In such a sense, the 
publicly released disclosures are more credible than private 
communications (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; 
Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). He (2018) finds that 
managers possess no legal accountability for privately circu-
lating incorrect or misleading information to BCR agencies. 
Second, publicly released risk information could impact the 
anticipated value of a company's future cash flow over for-
ming and/or changing market expectations. The anticipated 
future cash flow change would then modify a BCR agency's 
evaluated level of the company's creditworthiness, which 
cannot be achieved by privately communicating firm infor-
mation to BCR agencies. Also, previous literature suggests 
that better disclosure can (a) decrease information asymme-
try, which decreases agency risk; (b) decrease adverse selec-
tion costs to a firm; and (c) reduce uncertainty and 
information risk, thus decreasing the firm's cost of capital 
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Dhaliwal, 
Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Elbannan & Elbannan, 2015; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Fil-
zen, 2015; Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; 
Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 2011; Tan et al., 2017; 
Verrecchia, 1983). 
Finally, from legitimacy and resource dependence 
theoretical perspectives, enhanced disclosures can pro-
vide an essential link between banks and critical 
resources, such as access to finance, business contracts 
and suppliers (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Consequently, based on 
the above theories, prior studies have examined the rele-
vance of banks' disclosures with the aim of improving 
links with the external environment to enhance manage-
rial monitoring, reduce information asymmetry, gain 
access to resources, and consequently enhance BCRs 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). This study, thus, draws insights 
from multiples theories, including agency, signalling, 
legitimacy and resource dependence theories to explain 
the value relevance of banks' risk disclosures, as well as 
governance structures and their moderating impact 
on BCRs. 
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3.2 | The informativeness of risk 
disclosures and BCRs 
IFRS/IAS and Basel Accords have placed growing impor-
tance on risk disclosures (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; 
BCBS, 2015b). It is crucial to identify the benefits that 
risk disclosures can provide. If external users find risk 
disclosures valuable, then, agency theory suggests that 
increased risk disclosure can facilitate managerial moni-
toring by reducing information asymmetry, and thereby 
decrease the cost of capital through enhanced BCRs 
(Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Chan et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kuang & 
Qin, 2013). On the other hand, if banks disclose sensitive 
information regarding risk, it might have adverse effects 
on BCRs, and thus the extent of risk disclosure arguably 
depends upon market transparency levels and the cost/ 
benefits of risk disclosures (Hertig, 2006). 
The role of accounting disclosure in decreasing ineffi-
ciencies in debt and capital markets has been the subject 
of wide research (See Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995, 2001, 
for further review). Specifically, disclosure literature sug-
gests that, even in an efficient capital market, insiders 
have greater information compared to outside investors 
on their companies' anticipated future performance and 
risk (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Healy and Palepu (2001) 
suggest that if regulations and standards of auditing and 
accounting work perfectly, financial disclosures convey 
variations in their company's performance to outside 
investors. On the other hand, Healy and Palepu (1993), 
He (2018), and Healy and Palepu (1995) indicate that if 
regulations and standards of auditing and accounting are 
imperfect, a more expected opportunity, managers com-
promise between creating accounting choices and disclo-
sures to credibly disclose private information of 
company's performance to outside investors, and to use 
reported performance for acquiring resources, political or 
corporate governance motives. Managers' drivers for 
making voluntary disclosures and their integrity are, 
therefore, remarkable empirical questions. Based on the 
above argument, we suggest that signalling and resource 
dependence theories may enhance the level of our under-
standing relating to risk disclosure and the BCRs nexus. 
Signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence theories 
assume that increasing the level of risk disclosure can 
send important signals to credit rating agencies regarding 
current and future performance and risk management 
practices of banks, which can improve BCRs and reduce 
the cost of capital by facilitating access to critical 
resources (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Healy & Pal-
epu, 2001). 
Prior evidence relating to the relationship between 
general disclosure and BCRs is limited. Meanwhile, 
previous research suggests that rating agencies tend to 
incorporate complex information, such as disclosure 
quality into risk assessments. For example, Aman and 
Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003), Chan et al. (2013), DeBoskey and 
Gillett (2013), He (2018), Heflin et al. (2011), Kuang and 
Qin (2013), Sengupta (1998), and Tran (2014) find a posi-
tive association between disclosure quality and BCRs. For 
instance, He (2018) suggests that firms generally offer 
credible commitment to improving disclosure transpar-
ency to achieve the desired credit rating. In the same 
vein, Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016); Al-Hadi, Taylor, 
and Al-Yahyaee (2016) suggest that market risk disclo-
sure decreases information asymmetry, which eventually 
increases investment efficiency using a sample of GCC 
financial firms. Using a Chinese sample, Li et al. (2019) 
support the role of risk disclosures in improving firm 
investment efficiency. Finally, a number of studies show 
that risk disclosure may impact capital market partici-
pants (Campbell et al., 2014; Elbannan & Elbannan, 
2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 
2016; Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013; Tan et al., 2017). For instance, using a USA sample, 
Hope et al. (2016) suggest that specific risk disclosures 
help financial analysts to assess fundamental risks that 
face a firm. Heinle and Smith (2017) also show that 
improved risk disclosures has a negative impact on cost 
of capital. 
However and based on our extensive literature sea-
rch, the relationship between risk disclosure and BCRs 
has not been previously examined. This is in line with 
Elshandidy et al. (2018, p. 73), who argue that “All of the 
previous studies are concerned with equity markets, with 
no study yet addressing risk reporting in debt markets. 
Such studies are required to identify how firms' risk disclo-
sure strategies affect the following: (a) debt providers' deci-
sions; (b) credit ratings; and (c) predicting distress, default, 
and bankruptcy risks.” 
This, therefore, offers us a genuine opportunity to 
make a new contribution to the existing literature by 
examining the link between risk disclosures and BCRs. 
In particular, and to the extent that general voluntary dis-
closures are informative, our first hypothesis is that: 
H1: Risk disclosures have a positive impact on BCRs. 
3.3 | BCRs–risk disclosure nexus: The 
moderating effect of governance 
If risk disclosures lead to better BCRs, then, what factors 
can alleviate its influence? To our knowledge, prior liter-
ature has not examined this question, and the related 
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research offers little theoretical direction or empirical 
suggestion. Most previous literature on risk disclosure 
has focused on the main effect with equity markets, with 
no study, focussing on risk disclosure in debt markets 
(Elshandidy et al., 2018). Thus, it is important to finding 
the boundary settings of the theory. Building on multi-
theoretical framework that incorporates insights from 
agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence 
theories, we explored the idea that governance structures 
can be a significant moderator of the relationship 
between risk disclosures and BCRs. Prior Literature sug-
gests that characteristics of governance structures shape 
the financial reporting environment and their ability to 
impact banks' performance (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 
2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom 
et al., 2016a, 2016b; Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 
2018; Elamer, Ntim, & Abdou, 2017; Elamer, Ntim, 
Abdou, & Pyke, 2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, Zalata, & 
Elmagrhi, 2019). Hence, the influence of risk disclosures 
on BCRs is likely to be contingent on the characteristics 
of governance structures (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Samaha, Khlif, & 
Hussainey, 2015). Important among these characteristics 
are the ownership type and the boards' structure. Specifi-
cally, prior research points out that banks' board of direc-
tors and ownership structures may play significant role 
than in traditional non-financial institutions. In particu-
lar, financial institutions have larger board size and less 
ownership concentration than non-financial institutions 
due to complex, opaque and diverse operations, as well 
as heavy regulations (O'Sullivan, Mamun, & Hassan, 
2015). Thus, the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs is 
expected to be contingent on boards' structure, particu-
larly the size of the board and the extent of its indepen-
dence. Of the multiple bank characteristics, boards' 
structure appears to be particularly relevant in develop-
ing countries. 
Empirically, prior studies indicate that BCRs are 
affected by firm-level governance structures, such as 
board size, CEO duality, and board independence 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; 
Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa, 
2015; Shen, Huang, & Hasan, 2012). For instance, less 
powerful CEOs, greater gender diversity, higher indepen-
dence, and increased managerial monitoring often associ-
ated with larger boards (Dalton & Dalton, 2011) can 
reduce agency conflicts among shareholders, managers, 
and bondholders. Similarly, resource dependence theory 
suggests that larger boards may offer better access to the 
external environment by facilitating access to vital 
resources and thereby enhance BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 
2013). Thus, the board supervisory effectiveness may 
work as an important moderator, helping or obstructing 
the risk disclosure–BCRs relationship (Elshandidy & 
Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Mokhtar & Mel-
lett, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Tourigny, Dougan, 
Washbush, & Clements, 2003). Specifically, improvement 
in the effectiveness of board supervision leads to 
improvement in managerial monitoring, which might 
affect risk the disclosure–BCRs relationship positively, if: 
the percentage of independent directors increases 
(Alshbili, Elamer, & Beddewela, 2018; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Conyon & Peck, 1998), the of CEO and 
Chairman are different—no role duality—(Al-Hadi, 
Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Alnabsha et al., 
2018; Elamer et al., 2017; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, & Pyke, 
2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, Zalata, & Elmagrhi, 2019), 
and the percentage of independent directors increases 
(Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013). Also, it is essential to cogitate board size as an 
aspect that drive board supervisory effectiveness. Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2008) and Jensen (1993) emphasise 
that that larger boards tend to have problems of coordi-
nation, communication, and free-riding, and thereby 
impact negatively on the level of risk disclosures 
and BCRs. 
In addition to boards' structure, the impact of risk dis-
closures on BCRs is further likely to be contingent also 
on the ownership type—whether government, foreign, or 
block ownership is present. The level of ownership con-
centration and the type of control employed by main 
shareholders will incidentally determine the board super-
visory effectiveness, conditioning the effect of risk disclo-
sures on BCRs (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, 
Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 
2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elamer et al., 2017). 
The literature largely favours the view that when owner-
ship is concentrated, disclosure is poorer, and the BCRs 
they obtain are more likely to be lower (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Werner, Tosi, & Gomez-Mejia, 2005). 
However, ownership concentration may indicate that 
stockholders are better capable of protecting their inter-
ests. Thus, large shareholders may improve risk disclo-
sures, which may lead to improved BCRs (Al-Hadi, 
Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013). However, the key owners' interest, 
capability and motivation to employ supervision will 
decide the effectiveness of the extent of managerial moni-
toring (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Hasan, 
Taylor, Hossain, & Richardson, 2017; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & 
Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & 
Jiang, 2008). There are a number of reasons for expecting 
that the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs may be 
weaker in government- and block-owned banks (Al-Hadi, 
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Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 
2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013). First, key shareholders are expected to 
have both the motivation to monitor management's 
behaviour and, therefore, arguably reduced level of 
agency problems. However, extent of agency conflict may 
rather increase between key shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, 
Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 
2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). For example, block 
owners may collude and connive with management with 
the aim of expropriating the wealth of minority share-
holders, which may adversely affect the level of risk dis-
closures and BCRs (Al-Hadi et al., 2017; Al-Hadi, Hasan, 
& Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Second, the role of government or for-
eigners as major shareholders, especially in unstable 
economies with political stability, regulatory, and corrup-
tion problems may help in reducing agency conflicts, 
which can have a positive effect on the level of risk dis-
closures and BCRs (Al-Hadi et al., 2017; Al-Hadi, Hasan, 
& Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-
Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Borisova, Fotak, Holland, & Megginson, 2015; 
Kaufmann et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Com-
pared with Anglo-Saxon firms, the ownership structure 
of MENA banks is exceptionally concentrated, to the 
extent that there are nearly no banks with dispersed own-
ership (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, 
& Al-Yahyaee, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016a, 2016b; 
Amico, 2014). Therefore, in such a context, we will expect 
ownership structure to also have a moderating effect on 
the relationship between risk disclosure and BCRs. 
Meanwhile, prior studies examining the moderating 
effect of governance structures (board and ownership 
mechanisms) on the relationship between risk disclo-
sures and BCRs are generally rare, but particularly acute 
in emerging countries, such as those in the MENA 
region. Therefore, our final hypothesis is that: 
H2: Governance structures (i.e., SSB, board size, CEO 
duality, gender diversity, BBID, block, governmental, 
and foreign ownership) moderate the relationship 
between risk disclosures and BCRs. 
4 | RESEARCH  DESIGN  
4.1 | Sample selection and data sources 
The sample was selected from a total population of 118 
listed commercial and Islamic banks in 12 MENA 
countries with full data over eight fiscal years (2006– 
2013). The banks (countries) were initially identified 
based on the Bankscope database, but due to the 
unavailability of some of the required data, the final sam-
ple consisted of 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock 
exchanges, generating a total of 700 observations. 
The study covers these eight fiscal years as they repre-
sent the most recent years for which data was available 
for the sampled banks. We begin with 2006 as the Basel 
accord became applicable in the MENA region from mid-
2005. Also, data is not available for a majority of our sam-
ple prior to the year 2006. Noticeably, the sample time-
frame spans over the pre-, during, and post-2007/08 
financial crisis periods. A detailed sample construction 
procedure is presented in Table 2. Risk disclosures and 
corporate governance data were collected from banks' 
annual reports, which were downloaded from the Perfect 
Information database or from the banks' own websites. 
Finally, financial data was collected from annual reports, 
as well as the Bankscope database. Country-level macro-
economic and governance data was collected from the 
World Bank database. 
4.2 | Variables definition and model 
specification 
We classify the variables into six main categories as 
described in Table 3, which provides full definition of all 
of the variables employed in the study. Firstly, following 
past studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Grassa, 
2015; Jorion, Shi, & Zhang, 2009), the dependent variable 
is the Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE). The 
main reason for choosing Fitch is that it has the largest 
market share of the banking market in the MENA region. 
As explained by Fitch, a long-term issuer default ratings 
represent the rating agency's current opinion on an 
entity's overall vulnerability to default on its financial 
commitments, which reflect the financially uncured 
nature of that entity (Fitch Ratings, 2015). We assign the 
Fitch ratings, a value from 1, which reflects the highest 
default risk and lowest BCR, to 22, which reflects the 
lowest default risk and highest BCR, as described in 
Table 3. 
Secondly, we collect data on risk disclosure index 
(RDI), which strives to measure the level of risk disclo-
sure in six key areas and 96 individual items drawn from 
the IFRS 7 and 9/IAS 32 and 39, Basel Accords (I, II and 
III), and prior literature (e.g., Greco, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2013). Appendix contains the individual items and their 
scoring procedure. The sub-indices consist of credit risk 
disclosure index (CRDI); liquidity risk disclosure index 
(LRDI); market risk disclosure index (MRDI); capital 
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TABLE  2  Sample construction procedure 
Country Total banks Banks selected IBs obs CBs obs DBs obs Full sample Percentage 
Bahrain 11 9 36 8 24 68 9.71% 
Egypt 11 11 13 40 20 73 10.43% 
Jordan 12 12 13 75 3 91 13.00% 
Kuwait 13 10 36 35 5 76 10.86% 
Lebanon 6 6 0 28 16 44 6.29% 
Morocco 5 1 0 8 0 8 1.14% 
Oman 6 5 0 34 5 39 5.57% 
Qatar 8 8 24 11 28 63 9.00% 
Saudi Arabia 12 11 21 0 63 84 12.00% 
Syria 11 2 1 1 0 2 0.29% 
Tunisia 2 2 0 9 0 9 1.29% 
UAE 21 18 32 39 72 143 20.43% 
Total 118 95 176 288 236 700 100.00% 
adequacy risk disclosure index (ARDI); operational risk 
disclosure quality index (ODQI); and strategic risks dis-
closure quality index (SRDI). The index measurement 
method is frequently critiqued for being intrinsically sub-
jective (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Thus, to decrease bias, 
we employed the next steps. Firstly, two independent 
researchers coded a sample of 10 annual reports indepen-
dently, and their grades were matched. No key discrepan-
cies happened, with high agreement coefficient (0.83) 
that is greater than the acceptable threshold in the social 
science (reliability level ranges from 0.70 to 0.80) (Beattie, 
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004; Marston 
& Shrives, 1991). Secondly and subsequently, a single 
researcher (the main coder) finalized the coding of the 
rest of the RDI. Thirdly, the main researcher re-coded a 
sample of five annual reports randomly, and the findings 
were compared with his earlier original coding results. 
Seemingly, no significant discrepancies happened, with 
high agreement coefficient (0.95). Finally, we use 
Cronbach's alpha to evaluate the internal consistency of 
the RDI. The Cronbach's alpha was satisfactorily high at 
83.50%; noticing that the threshold level for Cronbach's 
alpha is 70% (Elghuweel, Ntim, Opong, & Avison, 2017). 
Third, we use the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) as  
a proxy for Islamic governance. Fourth, board structure 
variables include board size (BS), CEO power (DUAL), 
gender diversity (GDB), and board independence (BBID). 
Fifth, ownership structure variables include block owner-
ship (BOWN), foreign ownership (FOWN), and govern-
ment ownership (GOWN). 
Finally, the models contain a large number of bank-
and country-level control variables, which past studies 
suggest can affect BCRs (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; 
DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Heflin et al., 
2011; Kuang & Qin, 2013; Sengupta, 1998). Bank-level 
control variables include bank size (LNTA), performance 
(ROAA), liquidity (LIQ), income diversity (INCD), opera-
tions efficiency (COST), capital (CAP), and year dummies 
(YD). Country-level governance variables include voice 
and accountability (V&A), regulatory quality (RQ), and 
the rule of law (RL), whilst country-level macro-eco-
nomic variables include inflation (INFL), and GDP per 
capita (GDP) (Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland, 2015; Al-
Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016; Al-Hadi, Taylor, & Al-
Yahyaee, 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elamer et al., 
2017; Elamer, AlHares, Ntim, & Benyazid, 2018; Elamer, 
Ntim, Abdou, & Pyke, 2019; Elamer, Ntim, Abdou, 
Zalata, & Elmagrhi, 2019). 
Assuming that all the hypothesised relationships are 
linear, our basic ordered logistic regression model to be 
estimated is: 
RATEbt = α0 + βiRDIbt −1 
8 20 X X
+ βi RDI*CGbt −1 + βiCONTROLSbt −1 + εbt, ð1Þ 
i =1  i =1  
where: 
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings; 
RDI refers to risk disclosure index proxy for risk disclosure 
level; RDI *CG refers to RDI *SSB, RDI *BS, RDI *DUAL, 
RDI *GDB, RDI *BBID, RDI *BOWN, RDI *GOWN, and  RDI 
*FOWN. CONTROLS refers to the bank- and country-level 
control variables, including LNTA, ROAA, LIQ, INCD, 
COST, CAP, V&A, RQ, RL, YD, INFL, and  GDP. 
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TABLE  3  Summary of variables definitions 
Variables Definitions and coding 
Panel A: Dependent variables (Fitch long-term issuer default ratings). 
RATE Is the assigned rating score for Fitch's long term issuer default ratings coded according to: 22 if the bank has Fitch ratings 
of AAA; 21 if AA+; 20 if AA; 19 if AA-; 18 if A+; 17 if A; 16 if A-; 15 if BBB+; 14 if BBB; 13 if BBB-; 12 if BB+; 11 if BB; 
10 if BB-; 9 if B+; 8 if B; 7 if B-; 6 if CCC+; 5 if CCC; 4 if CCC-; 3 if CC; 2 if C; 1 if DDD, DD, D; 0 if NR, WD. 
Panel B: Risk disclosure index. 
RDI This is the overall unweighted risk index, consisting of six risk components, namely credit risk disclosure; liquidity risk 
disclosure; market risk disclosure; capital adequacy risk disclosure; operational risk disclosure; and strategic risks 
disclosure, and 96 individual items. Each item is scored 1 if it is disclosed and 0 otherwise. The scores are then 
aggregated and expressed as a percentage, ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest). Appendix contains the items and 
scoring procedure. 
W-RDI This is an alternative weighted risk disclosure index, consisting of six risk components, namely credit risk disclosure; 
liquidity risk disclosure; market risk disclosure; capital adequacy risk disclosure; operational risk disclosure; and 
strategic risks disclosure, and 96 individual items. Each item is scored 0 (not disclosed), 1 (risk item disclosed by bank 
contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information) and 2 (risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, 
good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information) if it is disclosed. The scores are then aggregated and expressed as 
a percentage, ranging from 0% (lowest) to 100% (highest). Appendix contains the items and scoring procedure. 
Panel C: Corporate governance (CG) variables. 
BOWN Percentage of shareholders with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings. 
GOWN Percentage of governmental ownership with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings. 
FOWN Percentage of foreign ownership with at least 5% to a bank's total ordinary shareholdings. 
BS Number of board of directors on a bank's board. 
DUAL 1, if a company's CEO and chairperson positions are held by same person, 0 otherwise. 
GDB Percentage of women directors to the total number of a bank's board of directors. 
BBID Percentage of non-executives directors to the total number of a bank's board of directors. 
SSB The total SSB characteristics score (SSB), which is calculated based on an SSB index that contains seven items. Scoring 
criteria are; SSB existence = 1, if a bank has SSB board, 0 otherwise.; SSB report =1, if a bank has disclosed SSB report, 0 
otherwise; SSB size =1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB's member, 0 otherwise; SSB meetings = 1, if a bank has 
disclosed number of SSB meetings, 0 otherwise; Experience = 1, if a bank discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise; 
Independent = 1, if SSB's members are independent from management, 0 otherwise; Total fees disclosed = 1, if a bank 
discloses SSB fees/ compensation, 0 otherwise. This are then aggregated and expressed as a percentage ranging from 0% 
(lowest) to 100% (highest). 
Panel D: control variables. 
LNTA Natural log of total assets. 
ROAA Percentage of net income to total asset. 
LIQ Net loans to total assets. 
INCD Percentage of net interest income/ average earning assets. 
COST Percentage of cost to income. 
CAP Ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
V&A Country-level voice and accountability score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which measures the extent to which a 
country's residents contribute towards choosing their government, enjoying freedom of independence and association, 
and having unrestricted access to media in years. A higher score means more accountability. 
RQ Country-level regulatory quality score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which captures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations in years that promotes private sector development. A higher 
score means better regulatory quality. 
RL Country-level rule of low score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010), which measures the level to which managers abide by the 
dictates of the rule of law. A higher score means better adherence to the rule of law. 
INFL Consumer prices index. 
GDP GDP per capita (current US$). 
YD Dummies for each of the fiscal years 2006–2013. 
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TABLE  4  Summary descriptive statistics for RATE, RDI and SSB index for all 700 bank-years observations 
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
RATE 
Mean 14.12 14.44 14.53 14.40 14.29 14.09 13.77 13.69 13.84 
Median 15.00 15.00 16.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 
STD 3.63 3.32 3.33 3.41 3.31 3.34 4.03 4.13 4.04 
Min 1.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Max 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 
The un-weighted risk disclosures index (RDI) (%) 
Mean 58.58 37.45 51.84 56.82 59.83 63.79 64.11 65.11 66.25 
Median 62.50 37.50 55.21 60.42 63.54 65.63 65.63 66.67 67.71 
STD 15.96 14.15 16.39 16.17 16.03 10.88 11.02 11.14 10.05 
Min 1.04 6.25 6.25 1.04 7.29 26.04 25.00 19.79 19.79 
Max 87.50 80.21 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 81.25 87.50 87.50 
The weighted risk disclosures index (W-RDI) (%) 
Mean 41.64 23.43 36.45 40.74 42.74 45.89 46.15 47.13 47.74 
Median 44.79 21.88 39.58 43.75 45.57 46.61 47.92 48.44 48.44 
STD 12.58 10.53 13.01 12.56 12.84 7.91 7.81 8.07 7.54 
Min 1.04 3.65 3.65 1.04 3.65 14.58 14.06 9.90 9.90 
Max 70.31 55.21 66.67 66.67 67.71 65.63 61.46 70.31 70.31 
SSB index (%) 
Mean 19.86 14.29 16.71 17.86 21.57 21.57 20.71 21.57 23.86 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 27.29 22.86 25.29 25.86 27.71 28.00 27.71 28.71 30.29 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 85.71 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Our final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 
2006 to 2013. This table reports descriptive statistics of Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE), the levels of compliance with un-
weighted (RDI) and weighted risk disclosures index (W-RDI) and Shariah supervisory board index (SSB). 
5 | EMPIRICAL  RESULTS  AND  
DISCUSSION  
5.1 | Descriptive statistics and bivariate 
analyses 
Table 4 summarises descriptive statistics for the RATE, 
un-weighted (RDI), weighted risk disclosures index (W-
RDI), and SSB for all bank fiscal years and also separately 
for each of the eight-firm years investigated from 2006 to 
2013. Table 4 shows that there is a high amount of varia-
tion in the BCRs between banks. For instance, RATE 
ranges from a minimum of 1 (highest default likelihood) 
to a maximum of 19 (lowest default likelihood) with the 
median RATE of 14.12 (good credit quality), which indi-
cates that most banks in MENA have good credit rating. 
However, there has been a continuous decrease in BCRs 
from 2008 onwards, which reflects the impact of contin-
ued crises, noticeably beginning with the GFC in 2007, 
and credit crunch in 2010. Specifically, the RATE aver-
ages around 14.4, 14.29, 14.09, 13.77, 13.69, and 13.84 in 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. However, 
the RATE started to experience observable increases in 
2013, which indicates relative recovery among MENA 
banks from the GFC crisis's effects. Finally, there is evi-
dence that the level of listed bank RATE before GFC is 
higher than those reported during and after GFC. This 
evidence reflects the extensive rate reversals and correc-
tive measures taken by the credit rating agencies towards 
addressing apparent flaws that were inherent in their rat-
ing methodologies. 
Also, Table 4 reports that there is high variability in 
risk disclosures among MENA banks. For example, and 
in line with past evidence (Ntim et al., 2013), the un-
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weighted RDI ranges from a minimum of 1 (1.04%) to a 
maximum of 84 (87.50%) with a mean of 56.24 (58.58%). 
Risk disclosure level (percentage) indicates that there is a 
significant level of discretion in the bank management's 
disclosure choices. It is also noticeable that there has 
been a stable improvement in the risk disclosures during 
and after the crisis. For instance, the banks have RDI 
mean score (percentage) of 35.95 (37.45%), 49.77 
(51.84%), 54.55 (56.82%), 57.44 (59.83), 61.24 (63.79%), 
61.55 (64.11%), 62.51 (65.11%), and 63.60 (66.25%) in 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, 
respectively. 
This indicates that the GFC and credit crunch 
appeared to have impacted on the extent of the banks' 
risk disclosures, especially after regulatory reforms (CG 
codes, Basel II, III and IFRS 7, 9/IAS 32, 39) in most of 
the countries sampled. Finally, a steady increase in SSB 
is also observable, which indicates the importance of 
banks' complying with Shariah rules and in signalling 
their Shariah-compliant status to their stakeholders with 
a view to legitimising their operations as shown in Table 
4. However, disclosures relating to the SSB's composition 
and competence is still very low, which indicates that 
Shariah-compliant disclosures are not common in MENA 
banks due to adverse disclosure culture (Koldertsova, 
2011; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009). 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for various gover-
nance and control variables included in the models. Gen-
erally, there is variability in the distribution of all the 
variables. For instance, BOWN ranges from 0 to 100%, 
with an average value of 55.44%. This suggests that 
despite the recommendations of the Basel Accords, 
World Bank and OECD best practices regarding the need 
for greater diversity in ownership structure, MENA banks 
still have high levels of ownership concentration. 
Further, our descriptive statistics indicate that the 
majority of the sampled banks' are profitable with a mean 
profitability ratio of 1.73%. Moreover, Table 5 indicates 
that most of the banks in the sample make a distinction 
between the chairman and CEO positions with a mean of 
81%, and these findings are consistent with the best prac-
tice governance reforms that have been pursued through-
out the MENA region. Although the board size ranges 
from 5 to 15 directors with a mean of 9.50 directors, only 
2% of them are observably female directors with a maxi-
mum of 27%. This means that men dominate MENA 
banks' boards. Regarding the country-level governance 
variables, Table 5 shows that voice and accountability is 
poor, with a mean value of −0.96 and ranges between 
−1.86 and −0.11. In addition, regulatory quality (RQ) and 
the rule of low (RL) reflect country-level governance 
quality with mean values of 0.28 and 0.30, respectively. 
Finally, the values of LNTA, LIQ, INCD, COST, CAP, 
INFL, and GDP as shown in Table 5 suggest wide vari-
ability in the sample and thus reduce possibilities of 
experiencing any instances of sample selection bias. 
Correlation coefficients among the variables used in 
the regression models to test for multicollinearity are 
presented in Table 6. The study reports both the Pearson 
product–moment correlations and the Spearman rank-
order correlations for robust results, and noticeably, the 
significance and direction of both correlations are gener-
ally similar. This demonstrates that there are no serious 
non-normality problems within the data. Further, there 
are significant relationships between the variables, as 
expected. For example, Table 6 shows that RATE is posi-
tively and significantly correlated with RDI, LNTA, 
ROAA, LIQ, GOWN, BS, BBID, SSB, RQ, RL, and GDP, 
whereas RATE is negatively and significantly correlated 
with COST, BOWN, FOWN, DUAL, GDB, V&A, 
and INFL. 
5.2 | Results and discussion 
Table 7 presents the ordered logistic regression analysis 
results for 10 different models. As noted previously, this 
study first examines the informativeness of risk disclo-
sures, and subsequently, ascertains whether governance 
structures have a moderating effect on the risk disclo-
sure-BCRs nexus using MENA banks. Generally, the 10 
models are all statistically significant (i.e., p-value <.01) 
and explain 47.17, 50.00, 51.19, 65.11, 55.39, 60.58, 69.13, 
57.35, 53.26 and 84.21% of the variation in RATE, respec-
tively. Similarly, the results show that risk disclosures 
and the moderating effect of governance structures can 
explain differences in RATE as follows. 
Firstly, risk disclosure (RDI) coefficients in Models 1– 
3 of Table 7 have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on RATE, implying that MENA banks with high 
RDI are more likely to receive higher ratings, especially 
post-GFC. The positive relationship between RDI and 
RATE is consistent with theoretical predictions. That is, 
increased RDI appears to alleviate agency conflicts 
(agency theory) by reducing information asymmetry 
among bondholders, managers and shareholders. In addi-
tion, there appears to also be a greater necessity for 
insiders to improve risk disclosures in order to legitimise 
(legitimacy theory) their decisions to bondholders and 
shareholders. Further, committing to greater levels of 
RDI is one way by which managers can signal (signalling) 
the quality and future prospects of a bank to the market, 
which can facilitate access to critical resources (resource 
dependence), such as finance. This also means that H1 is 
empirically supported, as well as offer further support to 
the findings of previous studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 
13 ELAMER ET AL. 
TABLE  5  Summary descriptive 
statistics of the independent and control 
variables for all 700 observations 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Corporate governance (CG)/ownership characteristics variables 
BOWN (%) 55.44 58.95 26.97 0.00 100.00 
GOWN (%) 16.40 8.70 21.19 0.00 89.06 
FOWN (%) 21.94 7.50 27.84 0.00 98.50 
BS (number) 9.50 9.00 1.91 5.00 15.00 
DUAL (dummy) 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.00 
GDB (%) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.27 
BBID (%) 0.89 0.91 0.17 0.11 1.00 
Panel B: Country level-governance and other control variables 
LNTA (log) 15.75 15.75 1.55 3.73 21.09 
ROAA (%) 1.73 1.64 2.44 −26.27 23.47 
INCD (%) 31.37 29.98 16.49 −63.35 180.83 
LIQ (%) 59.05 55.65 155.10 0.00 82.01 
COST (%) 42.46 39.17 26.50 3.99 284.00 
CAP (%) 20.42 17.40 14.62 9.26 204.41 
V&A (number) −0.96 −0.91 0.37 −1.86 −0.11 
RQ (number) 0.28 0.31 0.36 −0.95 0.80 
RL (number) 0.30 0.38 0.41 −0.78 1.04 
INFL (%) 5.30 4.50 4.24 −4.90 15.10 
GDP (USD) 23,961.70 19,288.75 23,546.24 1,472.6 93,714.10 
Note: Our final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and 
UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 
to 2013. Variables are defined as follows: block ownership (BOWN), government ownership 
(GOWN), foreign ownership (FOWN), board size (BS), independent chairperson (DUAL), gender 
diversity (GDB), percentage of non-executives directors (BBID), voice and accountability (V&A), 
regulatory quality (RQ), rule of low (RL), bank size (LNTA), performance (ROAA), liquidity 
(LIQ), income diversity (INCD), operational efficiency (COST), capital adequacy (CAP), inflation 
(INFL), and GDP per capita (GDP). Table 3 fully defines all the variables used. 
2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 
2003; DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Heflin et al., 2011; Kuang 
& Qin, 2013; Sengupta, 1998), which suggest that general 
disclosure has a positive effect on the RATE. 
Secondly, there is evidence that the governance struc-
tures have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between risk disclosure and BCRs, as shown in Model 3 
of Table 7. Specifically, the results show that the effect of 
RDI on the RATE is moderated by the governance struc-
tures as follows. First, the Shariah supervisory board 
(SSB) coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level for Models 2 and 3. This implies that 
MENA banks with better SSB are more likely to receive 
higher RATE, as shown in Table 7. More importantly, 
RDI*SSB coefficients are statistically significant in model 
3 and implying that H2 is also empirically supported. The 
positive impact of SSB on the RDI–RATE nexus is consis-
tent with the predictions of our proposed theoretical 
framework (i.e., support for the agency, signalling, legiti-
macy, and resource dependence theories). That is, the 
presence of the SSB appears to serve as a signal (signal-
ling theory) for improved managerial monitoring (agency 
theory), which can facilitate access to critical resources 
(resource dependence theory) by providing guarantees of 
compliance with Shariah rules and principles. This can 
legitimise (legitimacy theory) banks' operations in addi-
tion to reducing agency conflicts and information asym-
metry (agency theory), and hence, improving risk 
disclosures and BCRs. 
Second, the ownership structure results indicate that, 
in general, ownership structure has a significant moder-
ating impact on the BCRs. For instance, consistent with 
previous research (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; 
Grove et al., 2011; Li et al., 2014), the coefficients of 
GOWN and RDI*GOWN in Models 2 and 3 are positive 
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findings imply that MENA banks with high GOWN are 
more likely to receive higher RATE. Also, banks with 
high GOWN are more likely to have informative risk dis-
closures. Similarly, these results are consistent with the 
predictions of our proposed theoretical framework (i.e., 
support for agency, signalling, and legitimacy, and 
resource dependence theories). That is, GOWN appears to 
facilitate access to additional resources by providing guar-
antees to secure, for example, debt financing, which can 
enhance BCRs. Table 7 shows that the coefficients of 
FOWN and RDI*FOWN are statistically significant and 
negatively related to the RATE in models 2 and 3. These 
results are consistent with those of prior studies (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Li et al., 2014), but 
inconsistent with other studies, such as Choi and Hasan 
(2005), and Lin and Zhang (2009). Finally, the coeffi-
cients of BOWN in Models 2 and 3 are statistically insig-
nificant, which indicates that there is an insignificant 
relation between block ownership and BCRs in MENA 
banks. More importantly, Model 3 of Table 7 shows that 
the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs turns negative 
with the introduction of the RDI*BOWN and RDI*FOWN 
variables, which suggests that this influence is captured 
through these moderating effects. These results offer fur-
ther empirical support for H2 that governance structures 
have a moderating effect on the risk disclosure–BCRs 
nexus. 
Finally, the findings regarding board structures indi-
cate that there is a significant direct and indirect impact 
on BCRs. For example, the coefficient of BS and RDI*BS 
in Model 3 is positive and statistically significant, as 
shown in Table 7 (the coefficient in Model 2 is statisti-
cally insignificant, but still positive). This implies that 
MENA banks with large BS are more likely to receive 
higher RATE. More notably, Model 3 of Table 7 shows 
that the influence of risk disclosures on BCRs turns nega-
tive with the introduction of the RDI*DUAL variable, 
which suggests that this influence is captured through 
these moderating effects, and thereby providing addi-
tional empirical support for H2. 
5.3 | Additional analyses 
In this section, we conduct a number of additional ana-
lyses to gauge the robustness of our results to alternative 
measures or sub-sample estimations. Firstly and to deter-
mine whether the RATE behaviour differs over the pre-
and post-2007/2008 GFC periods, we further explored the 
effect of risk disclosures and governance structures on 
BCRs by separating the sample into pre-crisis period 
(2006), during crisis (2007–8) and post-financial crisis 
period (2009–13) and re-run Equation (1). The results of 
these additional analyses are reported in Models 7, 8 and 
9, respectively, of Table 7. The results are generally simi-
lar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 7. Model 8 of 
Table 7 shows that during the financial crisis period, 
board size and SSB have a positive effect on the BCRs. 
Remarkably and unlike other models, the results indicate 
that risk disclosures do not have an impact on BCRs dur-
ing the financial crisis period. Secondly, to examine the 
impact of the type of bank on the findings, we replicate 
our results reported in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 7 after 
splitting our sample into three types of banks, namely (a) 
Islamic banks (IBs), (b) conventional banks (CBs), and 
(c) dual banks (DBs) in which the results are shown in 
Models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 7, respectively. 
The results remain qualitatively the same as those 
reported previously in Model 3 of Table 7. However, there 
is a positive relation between BOWN, DUAL, and RATE 
in IBs, unlike DBs. This suggests that there is, to some 
extent, similarities among Islamic, conventional, and 
dual banks, with the results being generally robust to 
sub-sample estimations. Thirdly, in addition to using an 
un-weighted RDI measure, this study also uses weighted 
RDI measure to examine whether the findings are sensi-
tive to using a weighted or an un-weighted RDI proxy. 
We do this by replicating the analyses based on using the 
weighted RDI alternative measure. The results for the 
various models relying on the weighted RDI alternative 
are reported in Table 8. In general, the results suggest 
that risk disclosures and the moderation models are all 
statistically significant in explaining differences in RATE, 
and to a great extent are similar to those reported previ-
ously in Table 7 for the un-weighted RDI measure. 
Fourthly, this study further examines the effect of possi-
ble endogeneity problems that may be affected by the pres-
ence of unobserved heterogeneities and omitted variables 
bias problems. To this end, two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
statistical technique is used (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2013). In the first stage and based on our review 
of extensive prior studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; 
Grassa, 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; 
O'Sullivan et al., 2015), we conjecture that the eight gover-
nance variables, including the SSB are determined by all 
the 12 control variables. We then employed their predicted 
values in the second stage as instruments and re-estimate 
Equation (1) as follows: 
8 
RATEbt = α0 + βiRDIbt −1 + β̂i CGbt −1 
i =1  
X
8 12 X X
+ βi RDI*CGbt −1 + βiCONTROLSbt −1 + εbt: ð2Þ 
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Equation (2) is re-estimated similarly as Equation 
(1) by using the predicted values from the first stage 
estimation as instruments for the eight governance vari-
ables, including the SSB. The results of the 2SLS (Model 
10), which are reported in Tables 7 and 8 after control-
ling for unobserved heterogeneity, are fundamentally 
similar to those reported in Model 3 of both Tables 7 
and 8. Overall, the results reported for Model 10 in 
Table 7 imply that the evidence is fairly robust to possi-
ble endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted 
variables. The slight increase in the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the governance indicators in Model 10 of 
Table 7 compared with those in Model 3 of Tables 7 are 
generally in line with the findings of prior studies that 
instrumented parts of governance and risk disclosure 
variables tend to predict more strongly than their un-
instrumented parts (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2013). 
Finally, an alternative way of addressing the 
potential endogenous associations between RATE and 
RDI is to estimate the relationship by using changes in 
RATE and RDI (ΔRATE and ΔRDI) instead of using 
their levels as employed so far. The rationale is that if 
bank risk disclosures are really informative, then, 
direct changes (increases or decreases) in the RDI will 
lead to similar direct changes in the RATE (upgrades 
or downgrades). The advantage of this approach is 
that it has the ability to eliminate any spurious corre-
lations between RATE and RDI. Consequently, we 
estimate a changes regression by employing the fol-
lowing model: 
8 
ΔRATEbt = α0 + βiΔRDIbt −1 + β̂i
X
CGbt−1 
The results of the changes regression estimate, as 
shown in Model  11  of  Tables  7 and  8 are  fundamentally  
similar to those reported in Model 3 of both Tables 7 
and 8. The results of Model 11 are consistent with our 
previous evidence of a positive RDI–RATE relationship, 
implying further that our findings are robust to any 
potential endogeneities that may arise from spurious 
correlations. Moreover, the coefficient on ΔRDI) in  
Model 11 of Tables 7 and 8 is larger than that of the 
main Model. Overall, this result demonstrates that 
ΔRDI plays an important role in determining debt mar-
ket valuation, for which the findings of our additional 
analyses make us fairly confident that our conclusions 
are not driven by any spurious or endogenous 
correlations. 
6 | CONCLUSION  
Unlike current studies on the impact of risk disclosures, 
which tend to focus  largely on equity markets  often in a  
single financial market, this study examines the predic-
tive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on bank 
credit ratings (BCRs) within MENA debt markets. In 
addition, it also seeks to ascertain whether governance 
structures have a moderating effect on the risk of dis-
closure-BCRs nexus. Using 95 banks from 12 MENA 
countries over the 2006–2013 period and informed by 
insights drawn from agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence and signalling theories, our findings are as 
follows. 
First, our findings suggest that risk disclosures are 
informative in that there is a positive association 
between risk disclosure and BCRs. Second, we find that 
the relationship between risk disclosures and BCRs is 
contingent on the quality of governance. More specifi-
cally, we find that the informativeness of risk disclo-
sures on BCRs is higher in banks with larger board size, 
greater independence, higher government ownership, 
and better Shariah supervisory board, but lower in 
banks with greater block ownership, higher foreign 
ownership and the presence of CEO duality. The results 
are robust to controlling for a wide range of bank- and 
country-level variables, alternative risk disclosure mea-
sures and estimation techniques, bank- and country-
level governance variables, and different types of endo-
geneities. The interpretations and implications of our 
results are largely consistent with the expectations of 
our multi-theoretical framework that incorporates 
insights from agency, signal, legitimacy, and resource 
dependence theories. 
i =1  




tions to the existing literature. Firstly, the study contrib-
utes to the literature by providing first-time evidence on 
X
+ βi βiCONTROLSbt−1 + εbt: ð3Þ 
i =1  i =1  
the link between risk disclosures and banks' credit rat-
ings. Specifically, this study adds to the current debate on 
BCRs quality by offering evidence that suggests that rat-
ing agencies appear to indeed incorporate information 
contained in corporate risk disclosures into their risk 
assessments. Recently, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRS 9 to complement the 
previous IFRS 7, and IAS 32 and 39 along with the Basel 
Accords (I, II, and III) as a way of improving the extent 
to which risk is managed, measured and disclosed. Our 
evidence offers new empirical support for such policy, 
practice and regulatory reforms. Secondly, the study con-
tributes to the literature by providing first-time evidence 
on the moderating effect of governance structures (board 
and ownership structures) on the risk disclosure-credit 
rating nexus. Prior research suggests that firms with 
23 ELAMER ET AL. 
higher governance quality are more likely to make deci-
sions that maximise shareholders wealth, including com-
mitting to increased risk disclosures that can enhance 
credit ratings and thereby reduce the cost of capital (e.g., 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Kuang & Qin, 2013). This 
study extends this research by examining and providing 
evidence on the extent to which governance structures 
can moderate the risk disclosure–BCRs nexus. Thirdly, 
this study extends current understanding of the influence 
of risk disclosures in developing countries with specific 
focus on MENA countries by demonstrating why and 
how governance practices drive a number of bank-level 
outcomes, especially risk disclosure and BCRs. 
Observably, the current study has an important pol-
icy, practitioner, standards-setting, and regulatory impli-
cations in emerging markets, especially for banks, as well 
as countries in other emerging markets that are expecting 
or currently pursuing accounting, governance, and risk 
disclosure reforms. Evidence of increasing informative-
ness of risk disclosures suggests that efforts by banks, reg-
ulatory bodies, standard-setters and regulators to 
improve risk disclosure have had some positive impact 
on BCRs. However, given the wide variations in the 
levels of transparency regarding bank risk exposures that 
have been observed, greater monitoring and enforcement 
from central bankers, standard-setters, bondholders, reg-
ulatory authorities and central governments will be 
required to improve risk disclosure practices further. 
Finally, and although our evidence is robust, its limi-
tations need to be explicitly acknowledged. First like all 
archival studies, the risk disclosure, credit rating, and 
governance variables and measures employed may or 
may not reflect actual practice. Future studies may be 
able to offer new insights by conducting interviews and 
using in-depth case studies. Second, the governance vari-
ables used could be expanded to include others, such as 
board meetings and institutional shareholders. Third, 
future studies may be able to improve on our findings by 
employing alternative BCRs provided by other rating 
agencies, such as Moody's and S&P. 
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APPENDIX  
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI) 
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 
(2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review 
of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of Management 
Studies, 45(1), 196–220. 
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Financial risk disclosure 
(i) Credit 1-Exposure to credit risk and how they arise. 
2-Objectives, policies and processes for managing the credit risk. 
3-Method of measuring credit risk exposure. 
4-Adequately describes how credit risk management occurs including providing a clear linkage between the 
quantitative data and qualitative description. 
5-Changes in exposure to credit risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to manage the 
credit risk from the previous period. 
6-Amount of regulatory capital for credit risk. 
7-Information about credit quality of financial assets that are not past due or impaired. 
8-Renegotiated financial assets. 
9-Aging schedule for past due amounts. 
10-Impairment methods and inputs disclosed. 
11-Summary quantitative data about exposure to credit risk at the reporting date. 
12-Maximum credit exposure by currency. 
13-Maximum credit exposure by geography. 
14-Maximum credit exposure by economic activity. 
15-Disaggregated maximum credit risk exposure including derivatives and off-balance sheet items. 
16-Renegotiated loans for troubled borrowers. 
17-Risk of a counterparty. 
18-Credit risk concentrations. 
19-Derivatives. 
20-Off-balance sheet and joint venture structures. 
21-Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
22-Collateral. 
23-Disclosures to help users understand credit risk. 
(Continues) 
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Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI) 
(ii) Liquidity 24-Exposure to liquidity risk and how they arise. 
25-Objectives, policies and processes for managing the liquidity risk. 
26-Methods used to measure liquidity risk. 
27-Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, policies and processes to manage the 
liquidity risk from the previous period. 
28-Contractual undiscounted cash flows. 
29-Maturity analysis of non-derivative liabilities. 
30-Maturity analysis of derivative liabilities. 
31-Maturity analysis of off-balance sheet commitments and other financial instruments without contractually 
stipulated maturity. 
32-Maturity analysis of the financial assets. 
33-Expected maturity analysis. 
34-Derivative and trading liabilities Treatment. 
35-Liquidity risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
36-Liquidity buffers sources and volume. 
37-Sensitivity analysis. 
38-Financing facilities. 
39-Counterparty concentration profile. 
40-Disclosures to help users understand liquidity risk. 
(iii) Market 41-Objectives, policies, processes, and Strategies of market risk management. 
42-Structure and organization of the market risk management function. 
43-Instruments traded types. 




48-Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
49-Linkage with credit risk. 






56-Disclosures to help users understand market risk. 





Non-financial risk disclosure 
(v) Operational 62-Amount of regulatory capital for operational risk. 
63-Regulatory capital for operational risk Measurement approach. 
64-Operational risk management Strategies and processes. 
29 ELAMER ET AL. 
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RDI) 
65-The operational risk management function structure and organisation. 
66-Scope and nature of the operational risk reporting system 
67-Operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
68-Operational value-at-risk. 
69-Internal audit function/internal control system. 
70-Key risk indicators/early warning systems. 
71-Self-assessment techniques. 
72-Stress tests/ Scorecard models/scenario analyses. 
73-Operational risk event databases. 
74-Legal risks. 






81-Integrity/management and employee fraud. 
82-Business ethics/corruption. 
83-Disclosures to help users understand operational risk. 






90-GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand. 
91-Intellectual property rights. 
92-New alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions. 
93-Management of growth. 
94-Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name. 
95-Strategy. 
96-Disclosures to help users understand strategic risk. 
Total 96 Risk disclosure items 
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index 
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1: Risk item disclosed by bank. 
Procedure of scoring for weighted index 
0: Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative information. 
2: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information. 
